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Editorial china pe rspect i ves
Global China Beyond the Belt and 
Road Initiative
I VA N  F R A N C E S C H I N I
In the past few years, China’s increasing assertiveness on the international stage has made headlines all over the world, causing considerable discussion and concern among scholars, practitioners, 
and policymakers. However, the contentiousness of China’s global 
engagements is nothing new. Already in the 1 9 5 0 s, the Chinese 
authorities played a fundamental role in the creation of the non-aligned 
movement and began sending abroad technicians and workers to provide 
assistance to other developing countries in what would later come to be 
known as the Global South (Sorace and Zhu, forthcoming). Then, in the 
1 9 6 0 s, in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split and at the height of the Cold 
War, the Chinese leadership committed to waging Third World struggle 
against the twin imperialisms of the United States and the Soviet Union, 
a position known as “third-worldism” (Brautigam 2 0 0 9 : 3 7 ; Teng 2 0 1 9 ; 
Galway, forthcoming). China’s global role continued to be at the centre 
of heated debates even in later decades as the Cold War wound down, 
China embarked on its path of economic reform, and the Chinese party-
state set aside the anti-colonial project underpinning this rhetoric. The 
1 9 9 0 s saw Chinese companies beginning to “go out,” but the real turning 
point for China’s international engagement came in the late 1 9 9 0 s and 
early 2 0 0 0 s, as Beijing officially announced the “China Goes Global” 
strategy and concurrently joined the World Trade Organisation (Hong 
and Sun 2 0 0 6 ; Ye 2 0 2 0 : 8 4  and following). If this landmark event fostered 
liberal hopes for the country’s supposed democratic future, it also led to 
widespread concern over how China’s social dumping might affect other 
economies (Solinger 2 0 0 9 ). Then came the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI, 
yidai yilu  一帶一路).
Xi Jinping first announced the BRI during state visits to Kazakhstan 
and Indonesia in late 2 0 1 3 , but the Initiative gradually took shape over 
the following months and years. According to the official action plan 
released in March 2 0 1 5 , the BRI rests on five pillars: policy coordination, 
facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration, and people-
to-people contacts.1  Soon, wild figures began circulating, the most widely 
cited estimating that the BRI investment would add over one trillion 
USD of outward funding for foreign infrastructure in the decade starting 
from 2 0 1 7  (OECD 2 0 1 8 : 3 ). Such ambitiousness rattled nerves in Western 
policy circles. Although many scholars have since highlighted how the BRI 
is in many respects chaotic and very far from being the masterplan for 
world dominance envisaged by the Chinese authorities (Jones and Zeng 
2 0 1 9 ), the Initiative has had the effect of rekindling old Cold War fears 
about China’s global rise and influence. Boosted by propaganda efforts 
from the Chinese authorities and an often equally robust critical response, 
the debate has since become polarised. On one extreme are those who 
see the BRI as a benign plan under the aegis of South-South cooperation 
that will boost infrastructure in countries that could not otherwise afford 
it, thus reviving their ailing economies; on the other are those who argue 
that development aid and foreign investment are ultimately a Trojan 
horse through which the Chinese authorities aim to extract much needed 
resources, appropriate strategic assets, and boost their political influence. 
This, joined with the fact that today Chinese actors are more eager than 
ever to associate themselves with the BRI for purposes that range from 
economic gain to political legitimacy, has led to a disproportionate focus 
on the Initiative as a frame to understand China’s global engagements.
Drawing from the conference “Chinese Global Engagement Abroad: 
Changing Economic, Social, and Political Configurations,” held at the 
Hong Kong University of Science and Technology in July 2 0 1 9 , this special 
issue advances two main arguments. The first argument is that the current 
overwhelming focus on the BRI leads us to neglect other significant 
dimensions of the phenomenon called “Global China.” As Ching Kwan Lee 
has argued in her path-breaking monograph The Specter of Global China 
(2 0 1 7 : xiv): “Global China is taking myriad forms, ranging from foreign 
direct investment, labor export, and multilateral financial institutions 
for building cross-regional infrastructure to the globalization of Chinese 
civil society organizations, creation of global media networks, and global 
joint ventures in higher education, to name just a few examples.” In 
other words, Global China is far more than the BRI alone and should be 
understood not only through the geopolitical and economic frames that 
dominate the current debate, but also in broader terms that take into 
account the extreme variety of China’s international engagements and 
without losing sight of how these are connected to domestic dynamics. 
To quote Lee once again, studying Global China means “reimagining China 
beyond China, connecting, contextualizing, and comparing ‘Chinese’ 
development with that in other parts of the world” (ibid .). This is exactly 
what the contributors to this issue do, whether they discuss the rise of a 
host of powerful international construction contractors, how the Chinese 
official trade union is engaging with the labour movement in Cambodia, 
the impact of Chinese capital in the gambling industry on host societies 
in the Philippines and in Zambia, or the way Chinese investors in the scrap 
industry are remoulding the sector at a global level.
Second and directly related to the first point, this special issue also 
contends that many of the current analyses that focus on the BRI tend to 
put too much emphasis on what is observable at the moment, neglecting 
1 . “Vision and actions on jointly building Belt and Road,” Belt and Road Forum for International 
Cooperation website, 1 0  April 2 0 1 7 , http://www.beltandroad2 0 1 9 .com/english/n1 0 0 /2 0 1 7 /0 4 1 0 /
c2 2 -4 5 .html (accessed on 1 2  November 2 0 2 0 ). For a discussion of the policy implications, see 
Garlick 2 0 1 9 .
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the history and background of what we are witnessing today. Instead, 
we argue that a solid understanding of China’s politics and society in 
historical perspective is a necessary prerequisite for any analysis of 
Global China. Several contributions to this issue make this point clear. For 
instance, Hong Zhang shows that, although the days in which Chinese 
foreign aid was largely motivated by ideological reasons are ostensibly 
gone, the political economy of yesterday played a fundamental role in 
enabling an initiative as ambitious as the BRI and still reverberates in the 
activities of Chinese international construction contractors. In a similar 
vein, Tabitha Speelman adopts a diachronic perspective to discuss how 
China is tackling the reform of its immigration as it becomes a privileged 
destination for foreigners. Finally, Schulz puts the international scrap 
business in historical perspective, dissecting the complex interactions 
between Chinese and global dynamics in this sector since the 1 9 9 0 s. 
All of this shows that without an adequate understanding of China’s 
history and background, it is easy to make misplaced inferences about the 
unobservable, such as the intentions and the goals of various actors.
The special issue includes five research articles. In the first paper, 
Tabitha Speelman addresses an under-explored facet of Global China: 
China’s changing role as a destination for international immigration. She 
does so through the lens of the establishment in 2 0 1 8  of the National 
Immigration Administration, the country’s first national-level agency 
dedicated to immigration affairs. The most recent official data are from 
2 0 1 0 , when China’s census recorded 5 9 3 ,8 3 2  foreigners residing in the 
country for at least three months. While this was only about 0 .0 5 % of the 
Chinese population at that time, the figure still represented a significant 
increase from the early reform era, when around 2 0 ,0 0 0  foreign 
nationals lived in China. This has not only posed important challenges 
at a policy level, but has also fundamentally altered the perception of 
foreign immigrants among the populace – something that has become 
even more evident in the wake of the BRI, which includes a range of 
mobility-boosting plans. In such a context, Speelman sheds new light on 
the bureaucratic dimension of immigration to China, as well as on the 
policy debates that surround the growing inflow of foreigners into the 
country. This provides an important addition to the current literature 
on immigration to China, which so far has been quite marginal and has 
largely focused on the circumstances and integration of specific groups 
of immigrants, such as the Arab communities in Yiwu and the African 
communities in Guangzhou (see, for instance, Wen 2 0 2 0 , and Castillo 
2 0 2 0 ).
In the second paper, Hong Zhang proposes an archaeology of the 
BRI. She does so by excavating the roots in the Maoist era of one of 
the most important and often overlooked actors in Chinese-financed 
infrastructure projects abroad, China’s international construction and 
engineering contractors (ICECs). As she points out, this industry is born 
of aid-delivering entities that initially were administered by China’s line 
ministries and subnational governments and which were then stripped of 
their governmental status and incorporated into firms in the 1 9 8 0 s and 
1 9 9 0 s. In her paper, Zhang also explores the relationship between Chinese 
ICECs and China’s development cooperation practices, highlighting how 
these actors play a greater role in determining the agenda of the Chinese 
authorities than generally thought – a dynamic that she encapsulates 
in the innovative concept of “aid-contracting nexus.” This original focus 
on the role of contractors allows Zhang to advance a novel critique of 
the “debt trap” narrative that in recent years has dominated discussions 
of Global China and the BRI. Rather than attempting to cajole foreign 
governments to give up strategic assets and resources, she argues that the 
focus on infrastructure in China’s international development engagements 
is more of an external manifestation of its industrial policy to foster 
globally competitive industrial exporters at home – a “mercantilist” 
practice rather than “predatory” one.
In the third paper, I focus on a seldom-discussed dimension of the 
BRI and Global China, trade union diplomacy. Over the past decade, the 
official Chinese trade union – the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(ACFTU) – has repeatedly revised the articles of its constitution that 
outline its international mission. Already in 2 0 1 3 , an amendment called on 
the organisation to “promote the formation of a fair, rational, democratic, 
and harmonious new international order for the labour movement.” While 
this phrasing was subsequently dropped, the ACFTU today is required to 
“actively join in the establishment of the Belt and Road Initiative,” a goal 
that it pursues mostly through people-to-people exchanges. By taking 
Cambodia as a case study, I highlight how the ACFTU actively engages 
with and supports local pro-government unions, boosting their standing 
in a situation in which independent unions and labour NGOs operate 
under increasingly severe constraints. I also show that the Chinese union 
officials in their exchanges promote a corporatist model of trade unionism 
that puts much emphasis on efficiency and financial sustainability – a 
model that is very appealing for state-aligned unions with legitimacy and 
financial concerns.
In the fourth paper, Alvin Camba and Hangwei Li compare gambling 
dens in the Philippines and in Zambia to foreground the relationship 
between Chinese gambling capital, labour migration, and workplace 
exploitation. This study makes at least two important contributions to 
the literature on Global China. First, in a context in which discussions 
of overseas Chinese investment generally focus on the most visible 
manifestations of these flows of money, especially infrastructure, Camba 
and Li delve into the dynamics that underpin the shadowy private capital 
that fuels the global gambling industry, a market of hundreds of billions 
of dollars that often escapes official scrutiny. Second, they add to the 
debate about labour conditions in Chinese-invested companies abroad 
by bringing to light the linguistic dimension of exploitation. As Chinese-
funded gambling firms in both the Philippines and Zambia cater mostly 
to a Chinese-speaking audience, they rely on the “linguistic labour” of 
Chinese workers whom they have to import from abroad. Once in the 
host country, these workers find themselves in a position of vulnerability 
that enables the worst abuses.
In the fifth and final paper, Yvan Schulz explores the changing nature 
of China’s international engagements in the scrap business over three 
decades. In particular, he distinguishes three phases. First, in the 1 9 9 0 s, 
Chinese businessmen involved in this sector were mostly private, often 
self-made entrepreneurs who eked out a living by buying scrap in 
industrialised regions of the world and then bringing them back to China 
for processing. Second, in the 2 0 0 0 s the industry remained largely in 
the hands of the same socio-economic actors, but developing countries 
became a privileged destination and the Chinese authorities took the 
first steps to regulate scrap inflows into China. Finally, in the 2 0 1 0 s, the 
central and provincial governments took action to better control and 
monitor imports of scrap and waste material under the banner of China’s 
“ecological civilisation.” This led to the collapse of the rural recycling 
economy and to the relocation of the Chinese scrap processing industry 
abroad, often at the hand of large state-owned waste management 
companies. In tracing this history, Schulz painstakingly links domestic and 
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international developments, showing how the Chinese authorities have 
gradually tightened their grip on the national economy and how this has 
had reverberations globally.
Although over the past year, Covid-1 9  has disrupted many of the 
dynamics described above, Global China is here to stay. This requires the 
academic community to set aside old Orientalist, exceptionalist, and 
essentialist conceptions of everything Chinese to engage with China as an 
entity entangled in a complex web of relations and linkages with the rest 
of the world (Franceschini and Loubere 2 0 2 0 ). It also calls for an increased 
ability to go beyond simplistic narratives to highlight the interrelations 
between domestic and international developments within the context 
of a global system that functions according to capitalist logics. The five 
contributions in this special issue represent a step in this direction, and 
more will surely follow.
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